Improve proposal module - #780
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WalkthroughProposal lifecycle storage now uses expiry deadlines and terminal sentinels. Creation APIs require expiry values. Status queries derive ChangesProposal Lifecycle
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ShieldedMultiSig
participant ProposalManager
participant BlockTime
ShieldedMultiSig->>ProposalManager: Create proposal with expiry
ProposalManager->>BlockTime: Read current timestamp
ProposalManager-->>ShieldedMultiSig: Store encoded proposal state
ShieldedMultiSig->>ProposalManager: Query proposal status
ProposalManager->>BlockTime: Read current timestamp
ProposalManager-->>ShieldedMultiSig: Return derived status
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers: Mergeability Score: 🔵 Low · up to The PR updates proposal timing tests and simulator time control; if the simulator’s block-time field changes, expiry tests could silently run against an unchanged clock and provide misleading results. This is a bounded, localized risk that is mergeable with explicit owner follow-up to validate the expected field shape. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@contracts/test-utils/fixtures/blockTime.ts`:
- Around line 30-51: Update queryContext and setBlockTime to validate that the
existing query context contains a block with a bigint secondsSinceEpoch before
replacing it, and throw an error if that shape is missing or invalid. Preserve
the current block fields while updating only secondsSinceEpoch, so renamed
simulator internals fail loudly instead of silently leaving the clock unchanged.
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📒 Files selected for processing (8)
contracts/src/multisig/ProposalManager.compactcontracts/src/multisig/presets/ShieldedMultiSig.compactcontracts/src/multisig/test/ProposalManager.test.tscontracts/src/multisig/test/ShieldedMultiSig.test.tscontracts/src/multisig/test/mocks/MockProposalManager.compactcontracts/src/multisig/test/simulators/ProposalManagerSimulator.tscontracts/src/multisig/test/simulators/ShieldedMultiSigSimulator.tscontracts/test-utils/fixtures/blockTime.ts
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| export enum RecipientKind { |
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🔴 blocking: RecipientKind and Recipient (line 60) are undocumented, while ProposalStatus and Proposal got thorough blocks in this PR. RecipientKind should say what each variant means and which rail accepts it — toShieldedRecipient rejects UnshieldedUser, toUnshieldedRecipient rejects ShieldedUser, and that mismatch is exactly the hazard _createProposal warns about. Recipient should state that address is raw 32 bytes whose interpretation depends on kind.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
| @@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ export circuit deposit(coin: ShieldedCoinInfo): [] { | |||
| export circuit createShieldedProposal( | |||
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🔴 blocking: createShieldedProposal has no doc comment, so this PR adds a required parameter to an integrator-facing circuit without stating its units (seconds since the Unix epoch), its constraints (must be in the future, must exceed the reserved sentinel range), or that the preset imposes no upper cap. The module documents all of it, but the preset is what dApps call. Unblocked by documenting expiry; the preset's other missing docs are pre-existing and out of scope here.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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❔ question (non-blocking): _approveProposal (line 130) pins _proposalApprovals.member(id) == false on the first approval, so two first approvers of one proposal collide on that read as well, independently of the _approvalCount cell. Is that worth folding into the same fix? Flagging it so the approval-count refactor removes both collision points rather than one.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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Yes, I think we have to fold it into the same fix
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🔵 followup (pre-existing, for the deferred multisig refactor): _approveProposal line 136 does getApprovalCount(id) + 1 — a read-modify-write on _approvalCount[id]. The read pins the old count into the transaction, so two signers approving the same proposal in one block conflict: the loser is rejected at inclusion and has to rebuild, re-prove and resubmit. Concurrent approval is the normal multisig flow, and the same pinned read makes executeShieldedProposal conflict with a late approval landing in the same block.
The per-signer approval inserts are blind per-key writes and never conflict, so the count cell is the only collision point. One direction: drop _approvalCount and prove the threshold at execute time from the per-signer entries (K membership checks over caller-supplied approvers).
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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I think I agree. Will confirm and/or discuss when tackling the refactor
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🔵 followup: the approval-concurrency limitation above isn't documented anywhere in the preset. There is a convention for this — ConfidentialFungibleToken.compact:163 carries @warning Known limitations. / Concurrency. Two transfers to the same recipient in the same block conflict. Documented limitation; acceptable for the v1 target use case. The header here documents the getCaller / contract-signer limitation at length but is silent on approvals. Worth writing down even while the fix is deferred.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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Same response, will address in refactor
| // ─── State ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── | ||
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| export ledger _nextProposalId: Counter; | ||
| export ledger _proposals: Map<Uint<64>, Proposal>; |
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🔵 followup: lapsed proposals have no cleanup path. _cancelProposal routes through assertProposalActive, which rejects once the deadline passes, and there is no _proposals.remove, so every expired proposal keeps its entry and its original deadline forever and this map grows monotonically. The struct docs explain that the retained deadline is what tells a reader when it lapsed — worth stating the consequence too: no pruning circuit exists, growth is unbounded, and a consumer that needs cleanup must compose it. Adding a prune circuit is a separate design decision, not this PR.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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| ### Changed | ||
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| - Refactor ProposalManager (#780) |
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⚪ nitpick: the breaking changes aren't marked, and this file uses a **Breaking:** prefix elsewhere (see the _isInitialized entry). Three integrator-facing breaks here: Proposal.status (enum) → state: Uint<64>, the new required expiry parameter on _createProposal / createShieldedProposal, and getProposalStatus returning Inactive instead of reverting for a missing id.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
| * still carries its original deadline, which is what tells a reader when it | ||
| * lapsed. | ||
| * | ||
| * @warning `state` is a DEADLINE, not a ready-at time. `state > blockTime` |
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⚪ nitpick: this reads awkwardly, and it states the comparison backwards from the code — blockTimeLt(state) is blockTime < state, so the subject is the block time, not state. It also contradicts the list just above it, where state is sometimes a sentinel rather than a deadline. Suggested rewrite:
@warning In the deadline range, `state` marks when a proposal STOPS being
executable, not when it starts: it is executable while `blockTime < state`
and inert once `blockTime >= state`.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
| * | ||
| * @returns {[]} Empty tuple. | ||
| */ | ||
| export circuit assertProposalActive(id: Uint<64>): [] { |
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⚪ nitpick: worth one line here on how this failure differs from a state conflict. A conflicting read is transient — rebuild against fresh state, re-prove, and the transaction lands. proposal expired at inclusion is terminal: an integrator retry loop that treats all rejections alike will re-prove a dead proposal forever.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
| expect((await contract.getProposal(id)).state).toEqual(EXPIRY); | ||
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| await contract._markExecuted(id); | ||
| expect((await contract.getProposal(id)).state).not.toEqual(EXPIRY); |
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⚪ nitpick: assert the exact value instead of the negation — toEqual(contract.executedState()) pins which sentinel was written, where .not.toEqual(EXPIRY) would also pass for any other value.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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The suggestion creates a duplicate of the should write the executed sentinel into state test. Dropping it
| // not state. These specs pin what that buys an attacker, so the hazard is | ||
| // recorded as behavior rather than only as a doc warning. They are not | ||
| // defended against; the module cannot defend against its own consumer. | ||
| describe('direct state writes by a consumer', () => { |
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⚪ nitpick: state = 0 is the one reserved value these specs never decode — the group covers the sentinel forge (1) and backdated deadlines (> 2). forceProposalState(id, 0n) should read Expired and fail assertProposalActive with proposal not active (the sentinel check trips before the expiry one). One test completes the blast-radius set and pins which message that corner produces.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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Looking good @andrew-fleming! Left some blockings, questions and nitpicks comments. I'm still running the live testing locally.
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Confirmed all tests run successfully on a local live node on my end, Great work @andrew-fleming! 👌 |
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@andrew-fleming can you please create a tracking issue for this PR? |
| AMOUNT, | ||
| anHourAgo, | ||
| ), | ||
| ).rejects.toThrow(); |
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⚪ nitpick: bare rejects.toThrow() accepts any error. Pin 'ProposalManager: expiry not in the future', or comment why the live failure surfaces with a different message.
added by claude (dev3-midnight-basic-review)
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LGTM! Thank you @andrew-fleming!
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LGTM! Thank you @andrew-fleming!
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@andrew-fleming lets get the conflicts fixed and merge this PR. TY! |
3 participants
Fixes #828
ShieldedMultiSig will be refactored separately. This PR proposes to just include minor adjustments to the preset in order for tests to pass, so it's technically correct just not complete atm. To be explicit, the following items are deferred to a separate PR specifically targeting shielded multisig:
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests