acp: advertise the signing key by path, not by value - #6802
Open
Ayavuzer wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
The harness exported the agent's signing key to child processes by value, so every subprocess the adapter spawns inherited the secret in its environment — visible to anything that can read the process table's environment on platforms that expose it, and trivially leaked by any child that dumps its env for diagnostics. The key now travels as a file path: the harness writes it to a file only the current user can read (0600, created exclusively) and exports the path. The adapter accepts both forms — by value for compatibility, by path preferred — so existing launchers keep working. Tests cover the file's permission bits, exclusive creation, and the by-path/by-value precedence in the adapter.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
The harness exported the agent's signing key to child processes by
value, so every subprocess the adapter spawns inherited the secret in
its environment — visible to anything that can read the process table's
environment on platforms that expose it, and trivially leaked by any
child that dumps its env for diagnostics.
The key now travels as a file path: the harness writes it to a file
only the current user can read (0600, created exclusively) and exports
the path. The adapter accepts both forms — by value for compatibility,
by path preferred — so existing launchers keep working.
Tests cover the file's permission bits, exclusive creation, and the
by-path/by-value precedence in the adapter.