Update module github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go to v1.2.1 [SECURITY] (release-v0.8) - #3400
Conversation
ℹ️ Artifact update noticeFile name: acceptance/go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
Details:
|
|
🤖 Finished Review · ✅ Success · Started 8:50 PM UTC · Completed 8:54 PM UTC |
|
Looks good to me Previous runLooks good to me Previous run (2)Looks good to me Previous run (3)Review — ✅ ApprovePR: #3400 — Update module github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go to v1.2.0 [SECURITY] (release-v0.8) SummaryThis is an automated Renovate security update bumping Changes reviewed
AnalysisCorrectness: The changes are machine-generated by Renovate and limited to Security: The PR correctly addresses the CVE. The vulnerability allowed a single compromised log to bypass multi-log threshold verification — a meaningful fix for supply chain verification tooling. The update from v1.1.4 to v1.2.0 includes the patch (fix landed in v1.1.5 and is included in v1.2.0). Scope & intent: The PR is appropriately scoped to the Follow-up note: The root Findings
Previous run (4)Review — approveSecurity dependency update for CVE-2026-49834 This PR updates Changes reviewed
Analysis
Observations
Verdict✅ Approve — Clean security dependency update with no source code changes. |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. Click here to find out more. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
|
a523834 to
d2ab8c3
Compare
|
🤖 Finished Review · ✅ Success · Started 3:30 PM UTC · Completed 3:34 PM UTC |
d2ab8c3 to
2a39d65
Compare
|
🤖 Finished Review · ✅ Success · Started 1:16 AM UTC · Completed 1:23 AM UTC |
2a39d65 to
308dc40
Compare
|
🤖 Finished Review · ✅ Success · Started 1:19 PM UTC · Completed 1:27 PM UTC |
308dc40 to
05af494
Compare
|
🤖 Finished Review · ✅ Success · Started 2:49 AM UTC · Completed 2:56 AM UTC |
|
🤖 Finished Retro · ✅ Success · Started 7:25 PM UTC · Completed 7:38 PM UTC |
Retro: PR #3400 — Renovate security update for sigstore-goPR type: Bot-authored dependency update (Renovate) bumping Timeline: Opened July 10, merged August 3 (24 days). The review agent ran 5 times — once on open and 4 times on Renovate rebases — all resulting in APPROVED. Human reviewer (simonbaird) approved and merged on August 3. What went well
What could go better
No new proposals — existing issues cover these patternsThe improvement opportunities identified here are extensively covered by existing open issues:
With 20+ open issues across both repos covering bot-PR dispatch skipping, rebase dedup, and review re-run prevention, filing new proposals would add noise. The evidence from this PR reinforces the priority of the existing issues listed above. |
This PR contains the following updates:
v1.1.4→v1.2.1sigstore-go has a multi-log threshold bypass via single compromised log
CVE-2026-49834 / GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
More information
Details
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
A verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.
As a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.
Note that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Upgrade to v1.1.5.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period
CVE-2026-54787 / GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm
More information
Details
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period for self-managed long-lived keys without certificates.
Impact
To verify a bundle with a self-managed long-lived key, the key needs to be wrapped in an
ExpiringKeytype that implies expiration semantics:Despite the API contract, the validator does not check the bundle signing time against the validity window. Attackers that obtain expired key materials may be able to sign bundles with those materials that are accepted despite a configured expiry date. This issue only impacts the long-lived signing key workflow, and not standard deployments involving a certificate authority.
Reproduction steps
Start from a sigstore-go checkout:
git clone https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go.git cd sigstore-go git checkout 8ca80c47ef03d26ebf174db7c296700b075b2c16Apply the patch containing the test case and associated materials:
Run the test:
go test ./pkg/verify -run TestPublicKeyValidityCheckedAgainstSignedTimestampOn vulnerable code, the test fails because verification succeeds even though the trusted
ExpiringKeyis not valid at the signed timestamp:Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
sigstore/sigstore-go (github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go)
v1.2.1Compare Source
What's Changed
v1.2.1 resolves GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm.
Full Changelog: sigstore/sigstore-go@v1.2.0...v1.2.1
v1.2.0Compare Source
What's Changed
New Contributors
Full Changelog: sigstore/sigstore-go@v1.1.4...v1.2.0
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.