DigestInfo validation to prevent RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signature forgery - #1151
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DigestInfo validation to prevent RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signature forgery#1151Zelzazor wants to merge 2 commits into
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Closed in favor of #1152 |
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Fixes #1149.
Basically, validation of
DigestInfostructure inverify()function for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 inrsa.jswas not validating any nested properties located between the required parts of said structure, allowing a forged signature to pass.I've made an additional check inside the
ifof theDigestInfostructure validation, in order to check what is the length of the capturedDigestAlgorithm, and compare it to it's only possible values.A regression test was made inside
tests/unit/rsa.jsto detect the forged signature. Test was executed before making the change with an expected fail state. Then executed the full test suite: 816 passing, 0 failing.Created a CHANGELOG entry documenting the fix and a CVE reference.
CVE: CVE-2026-85393