fix: restore eboot_core buildability broken by unresolved merge conflicts

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ target_include_directories(eboot_hal PUBLIC ${EBLDR_INCLUDE_DIR})
 # ---- Core boot logic ----
 add_library(eboot_core STATIC
     core/bootctl.c
-    core/boot_log.c
     core/image_verify.c
     core/slot_manager.c
     core/boot_policy.c
@@ -107,7 +106,9 @@ add_library(eboot_core STATIC
     core/bmc_handoff.c
     core/os_adapter.c
     core/ed25519_verify.c
+    core/sha512.c
     core/keystore.c
+    core/rollback.c
     core/debug_lock.c
     core/fw_decrypt.c
     core/image_tlv.c

core/ed25519_verify.c

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "eos_crypto_boot.h"
 #include "eos_types.h"
 #include <string.h>
-#include "eos_sha512.h"
+
 
 /* ================================================================
  * Field arithmetic mod p = 2^255 - 19
@@ -428,19 +428,21 @@ int eos_ed25519_verify(const uint8_t signature[64],
     eos_sha512_final(&ctx, k);
     reduce_hash(k);
 
-    /* Step 3: Compute k = SHA-256(R || A || M) reduced mod L */
-    /* Step 3: Compute k = SHA-512(R || A || M) reduced mod L */
-uint8_t k_hash[64];
-sha512_ctx_t ctx;
+    /* Compute [k](-A) + [S]B, which equals R for a valid signature. */
+    gf kA[4], sB[4];
+    scalarmult(kA, A, k);
+    scalarbase(sB, &signature[32]);
+    point_add(kA, (const gf *)sB);
+
+    uint8_t recovered[32];
+    point_pack(recovered, kA);
+
+    uint8_t diff = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) diff |= (uint8_t)(recovered[i] ^ signature[i]);
 
-sha512_init(&ctx);
-sha512_update(&ctx, signature, 32);       /* R */
-sha512_update(&ctx, public_key, 32);      /* A */
-sha512_update(&ctx, message, msg_len);    /* M */
-sha512_final(&ctx, k_hash);
+    /* Wipe the challenge scalar rather than leave it in boot-path memory. */
+    memset(k, 0, sizeof(k));
 
-uint8_t k[32];
-sc_reduce(k, k_hash);
 
     return diff == 0 ? EOS_OK : EOS_ERR_SIGNATURE;
 }

core/recovery.c

@@ -284,7 +284,6 @@ static int recovery_handle_write(eos_slot_t slot, uint32_t offset, uint16_t len)
     /* offset/len come straight from the wire; without this check a
      * recovery client can write past the slot boundary into the other
      * slot, boot-control blocks, or the boot log. */
-    uint32_t slot_size = eos_hal_slot_size(slot);
     if (slot_size == 0 || (uint64_t)offset + len > (uint64_t)slot_size)
         return recovery_send_nack();