embeddedos-org · srpatcha · Aug 27, 2026 · Aug 25, 2026
@@ -36,15 +36,17 @@ jobs:
             -DCMAKE_C_COMPILER=gcc-12 \
             -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=g++-12 \
             -DENABLE_COVERAGE=ON \
-            -DBUILD_TESTS=ON
+            -DEBLDR_BUILD_TESTS=ON
 
       - name: Build (host)
         run: cmake --build build/host --parallel $(nproc)
 
       - name: Run C unit tests
         run: |
           cd build/host
-          ctest --output-on-failure --parallel $(nproc)
+          # --no-tests=error: ctest exits 0 when it finds no tests at all, so
+          # without this a misnamed -D flag makes this job pass having run none.
+          ctest --output-on-failure --no-tests=error --parallel $(nproc)
 
       - name: Run Python tests
         run: |

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Claude code review.
+#
+# This complements — it does not replace — the automatic Copilot review that
+# runs on every PR via the "Code Quality Copilot review for default branch"
+# ruleset. Copilot does the fast first pass; Claude does the deeper one, and
+# only when asked, so routine PRs cost nothing.
+#
+# Two ways in:
+#   1. Mention @claude in an issue, a PR comment, or a review comment.
+#   2. Add the `deep-review` label to a PR for a full review pass.
+#
+# Requires an ANTHROPIC_API_KEY secret (org-level is easiest — one secret
+# covers every repo). Without it both jobs fail fast with a clear message
+# rather than reviewing silently with no credentials.
+name: Claude Code Review
+
+on:
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+  pull_request_review_comment:
+    types: [created]
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
+  issues:
+    types: [opened, assigned, labeled]
+  pull_request:
+    types: [labeled]
+
+# Never run two reviews on the same PR at once; a new trigger supersedes the
+# one in flight.
+concurrency:
+  group: claude-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  # ── 1. On-demand: someone wrote @claude ──────────────────────────────────
+  mention:
+    if: |
+      github.event_name != 'pull_request' && (
+        (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
+        (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
+        (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) ||
+        (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')))
+      )
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      issues: write
+      id-token: write
+    steps:
+      - name: Check credentials
+        env:
+          KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$KEY" ]; then
+            echo "::error::ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is not set. Add it as an organisation or repository secret."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 1
+
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
+        with:
+          anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+          use_sticky_comment: true
+
+  # ── 2. Full pass: PR labelled `deep-review` ──────────────────────────────
+  deep-review:
+    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.label.name == 'deep-review'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      id-token: write
+    steps:
+      - name: Check credentials
+        env:
+          KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$KEY" ]; then
+            echo "::error::ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is not set. Add it as an organisation or repository secret."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 1
+
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
+        with:
+          anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+          use_sticky_comment: true
+          prompt: |
+            REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+            PR NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+
+            Review this pull request. The PR branch is already checked out in
+            the working directory.
+
+            This repository follows the standards in its own CLAUDE.md,
+            QUALITY.md, TESTING.md, SECURITY.md and VERIFY.md — read the ones
+            that apply to the changed files and review against them, not
+            against generic style preferences.
+
+            Prioritise, in this order:
+              1. Correctness — logic errors, unhandled failure paths, integer
+                 overflow/underflow, memory safety, race conditions.
+              2. Security — unvalidated input crossing a boundary, injection,
+                 authorization that checks only authentication, secrets in
+                 source or logs.
+              3. Tests — does a new behaviour have a test that would actually
+                 fail without the fix? Flag assertions that cannot fail, and
+                 tests that only check the negative case.
+              4. Maintainability — only where it genuinely impedes a reader.
+
+            Report what you verified and what you could not. Say plainly when
+            a concern is unverified rather than implying you checked it. If
+            nothing needs changing, say so in one line — do not manufacture
+            findings.
+
+            Use `gh pr comment` for top-level feedback.
+            Use `mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment` (with
+            `confirmed: true`) for specific lines.
+            Only post GitHub comments — do not return review text as a message.
+
+          claude_args: |
+            --allowedTools "mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment,Bash(gh pr comment:*),Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr view:*),Bash(gh pr checks:*)"
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ stm32f4 | stm32h7 | nrf52 | rpi4 | riscv64_virt | esp32 | x86_64_efi | \
 imx8m | am64x | samd51 | sifive_u | cortex_r5 | none")
 
 option(EBLDR_BUILD_TESTS "Build unit tests (native only)" OFF)
-option(EBLDR_REQUIRE_SIGNATURES "Require Ed25519 signatures for boot" ON)
-option(EBLDR_RECOVERY_AUTH "Require authentication for recovery commands" ON)
-option(EBLDR_VERIFY_STAGE1 "Verify Stage-1 hash before jump" ON)
+option(EBLDR_REQUIRE_SIGNATURES "Require Ed25519 signatures for boot" ON)
+option(EBLDR_RECOVERY_AUTH "Require authentication for recovery commands" ON)
+option(EBLDR_VERIFY_STAGE1 "Verify Stage-1 hash before jump" ON)
 option(EBLDR_HARDENING "Enable compiler hardening flags" ON)
 option(EBLDR_SANITIZE "Enable ASAN/UBSAN for host builds" OFF)
 option(EBLDR_BUILD_FUZZ "Build libFuzzer fuzz targets" OFF)
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ add_library(eboot_core STATIC
     core/ecc_scrub.c
     core/bmc_handoff.c
     core/os_adapter.c
+    core/sha512.c
     core/ed25519_verify.c
+    core/secure_boot.c
+    core/fdt_loader.c
     core/keystore.c
     core/debug_lock.c
     core/fw_decrypt.c

@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ eBootloader follows a **90-day coordinated disclosure** policy:
 | Version comparison | Phase 1 | ✅ Implemented | `eos_image_check_version()` API |
 | Redundant metadata | Phase 1 | ✅ Implemented | Dual boot control block with CRC |
 | Anti-tearing writes | Phase 1 | ✅ Implemented | Power-safe metadata updates |
-| SHA-256 image hash | Phase 2 | 🔲 Planned | Full cryptographic hash for image verification |
-| Ed25519 signatures | Phase 2 | 🔲 Planned | Digital signature verification of firmware |
+| SHA-256 image hash | Phase 2 | ✅ Implemented | Full cryptographic hash for image verification |
+| SHA-512 | Phase 2 | ✅ Implemented | FIPS 180-4; required by Ed25519, `core/sha512.c` |
+| Ed25519 signatures | Phase 2 | ✅ Implemented | RFC 8032 verification of firmware signatures, `core/ed25519_verify.c` |
 | Anti-rollback counters | Phase 2 | 🔲 Planned | Monotonic counter prevents version downgrade |
 | Dual key slots | Phase 2 | 🔲 Planned | Primary + backup key for seamless rotation |
 | AES-256-GCM encryption | Phase 3 | 🔲 Planned | Encrypted firmware payloads |

@@ -17,7 +17,12 @@ Status is one of: `todo`, `in-progress`, `blocked`, `review`, `done`.
 
 | ID | Task | Owner | Verified by | Evidence |
 |----|------|-------|-------------|----------|
-| —  | None yet. | — | — | — |
+| T-001 | Make Ed25519 verification actually work (it rejected every valid signature) | security | reviewer | `eos_ed25519_verify()` rejected all three RFC 8032 §7.1 vectors and rejected a signature made by `python-cryptography` — the same library `tools/sign_image.py` signs with — so **no image signed by this repo's own tool could ever boot**. Two independent causes: (a) the challenge used SHA-256 zero-padded to 64 bytes instead of SHA-512, and (b) the curve arithmetic was wrong at the base case — `[1]B` did not return the base point, and `ge_frombytes()` failed to decode valid RFC 8032 points. Replaced `core/ed25519_verify.c` with a correct RFC 8032 verifier and added `core/sha512.c`. Now: 3/3 RFC vectors accepted; 512/512 single-bit signature flips rejected; non-canonical S (S+L) rejected. |
+| T-002 | Add SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4), which Ed25519 requires | backend | reviewer | New `core/sha512.c`. Digests for empty, `abc`, 1,000,000×`a`, and a 128-byte block match `sha512sum` exactly; streaming digests match the one-shot result across chunk sizes 1/63/111/112/113/127/128/129/255. |
+| T-003 | Replace Ed25519 tests that could not fail | testing | reviewer | Every test in `tests/unit/test_ed25519.c` asserted only that bad signatures are *rejected*, which a verifier that rejects everything passes trivially — that is precisely the defect it missed. Rewritten to assert both directions, RFC 8032 vectors first. 10/10 pass; the positive-vector test fails against the old implementation. |
+| T-004 | CI ran zero tests and reported success | testing | reviewer | `ci.yml` configured with `-DBUILD_TESTS=ON`, but this project's option is `EBLDR_BUILD_TESTS`; the flag set an unrelated cache variable and no test was ever built. `ctest` exits 0 when it finds no tests (verified: exit code 0), so the job passed green. This is how T-001 shipped. Fixed the flag and added `--no-tests=error`; with the old flag the job now exits 8. CI runs 11 tests. |
+| T-005 | Fix a mismatched `extern` that no compiler could see | backend | reviewer | `core/secure_boot.c` declared `eos_ed25519_verify(msg, msg_len, sig, pubkey)` while the definition is `(signature, public_key, message, msg_len)` — a caller would have passed a `size_t` length where a key pointer was expected. Both ad-hoc `extern`s removed; the single prototype now lives in `include/eos_crypto_boot.h`. |
+| T-006 | Build the two source files that were never compiled | backend | reviewer | `core/secure_boot.c` and `core/fdt_loader.c` were absent from `CMakeLists.txt`. `secure_boot.c` also called `eos_sha256()`, which was defined nowhere in the tree, so it could not have linked. Added the one-shot `eos_sha256()` to `core/crypto_boot.c` and both files to the build; clean under `-Wall -Wextra`. |
 
 ---
 

@@ -145,6 +145,15 @@ int eos_crypto_safe_compare(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t len)
  * SHA-256 Hashing API
  * ================================================================ */
 
+void eos_sha256(const void *data, size_t len,
+                uint8_t digest[EOS_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+    eos_sha256_ctx_t ctx;
+    eos_sha256_init(&ctx);
+    eos_sha256_update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)data, len);
+    eos_sha256_final(&ctx, digest);
+}
+
 int eos_crypto_hash(const uint8_t *data, size_t len,
                      uint8_t digest[EOS_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
 {
@@ -209,11 +218,6 @@ int eos_crypto_verify_image(uint32_t image_addr, uint32_t image_size,
  * underlying curve arithmetic is in core/ed25519_verify.c.
  * ================================================================ */
 
-/* Forward declaration — implemented in ed25519_verify.c */
-extern int eos_ed25519_verify(const uint8_t signature[64],
-                               const uint8_t public_key[32],
-                               const uint8_t *message, size_t msg_len);
-
 int eos_crypto_verify_signature(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
                                  const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_len,
                                  const uint8_t *public_key, size_t key_len)